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Legal Paternalism and the
Eclipse of Principle
R. GEORGE WRIGHT*
Legal paternalism involves, very roughly, requiring persons to do something for their own good. We often think of
debates between legal paternalists and non-paternalists as
taking place largely at the level of broad, basic principle.
This Article argues, however, that in our culture, disputes
over the proper scope of legal paternalism will increasingly
focus not on issues of basic principle, but on much more detailed, concrete, particular, contextualized matters. The four
major reasons for this eclipse of basic principles bearing
upon legal paternalism are herein identified, explored, and
illustrated.
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INTRODUCTION
Issues of legal paternalism arise in many contexts. Such contexts
include the regulation of suicide and assisted suicide in particular;1
commercial speech;2 recreational and therapeutic drug legalization,
decriminalization, availability, and screening;3 protective helmets
1

See generally infra Section VII.
See, e.g., Sorell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579 (2011); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (Stevens, J., for the plurality)
(“[W]hen a state entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading
commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining
process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First
Amendment generally demands.”); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487
U.S. 781, 790 (1988) (rejecting a paternalistic justification of a regulation of charitable solicitation speech); Retail Dig. Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d
638, 649 (9th Cir. 2016) (heightened judicial scrutiny for commercial speech regulations as a mechanism to “check raw paternalism”); Dana’s RR. Supply v. Attorney General, 807 F.3d 1235, 1251 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Paternalistic efforts at
social engineering are anathema to constitutional first principles.”); Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 687 F.3d 403, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (addressing commercial speech regulations “that seek to keep people in the dark for what
the government perceives to be their own good” (quoting Liquormart, 517 U.S.
at 503)); Beeman v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC, 315 P.3d 71, 87 (Cal.
2013) (constitutional skepticism regarding the “paternalistic ‘assumption that the
public will respond “irrationally” to the truth’” (quoting Liquormart, 517 U.S. at
503)). More broadly, see Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the
First Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 587–606 (2004).
3
See, e.g., Taylor-Failor v. County of Hawaii, 90 F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1101
(D. Haw. 2015) (paternalistic concern for government employee health); Kirby v.
Cty of Fresno, 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 832–37 (2015) (discussing several issues
bearing upon the cultivation of medical marijuana); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez,
37 N.E.3d 611, 614 (Mass. 2015) (addressing some legal ramifications of marijuana decriminalization); DOUGLAS HUSAK & PETER DE MARNEFFE, THE
LEGALIZATION OF DRUGS 94 (2005) (debating the merits of decriminalization of
drugs akin to heroin); Wayne A. Logan, After the Cheering Stopped: Decriminalization and Legalism’s Limits, 24 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 341–46
(2014) (addressing marijuana decriminalization’s legal consequences); Alexandra
Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1077–1102
(2015) (discussing some politically regressive and inegalitarian dimensions of
marijuana decriminalization); Scott Malone, Vermont legislature on track to be
first in U.S. to legalize marijuana, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2016, 4:16 PM),
2
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for motorcycle riders;4 self-representation and the limits of such a
right in criminal trials;5 workplace regulation and disability;6 selection of a conservator or guardian;7 smoking in public parks8 and
smokeless tobacco in specific public venues;9 sugar content in some

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-vermont-marijuana-idUSKCN0WG13X (proposal as still prohibiting consumers from growing plants at home, along with imposing a 25% sales tax).
4
See, e.g., Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519, 1521 (11th Cir. 1989) (rejecting
the claim that motorcycle helmet laws are purely paternalistic in their motives or
justifications); Buhl v. Hannigan, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 747–48 (1993) (briefly
exploring the constitutionally legitimate scope of legislative paternalism more
broadly); Robotham v. State, 488 N.W.2d 533, 540–41 (Neb. 1992) (rejecting the
claim of no valid state police power justification, beyond paternalism, for motorcycle helmet requirements); Benning v. State, A.2d 757, 762 (Vt. 1994) (to similar
effect); State v. Eckblad, 98 P.3d 1184, 1186 (Wash. 2004) (en banc) (noting the
motorcycle helmet requirement cases in the context of a challenge to mandatory
automobile seat belts).
5
See, e.g., Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (dignity and individual autonomy as underlying the right of criminal trial self-representation,
which presumes an appropriate mental capacity); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S.
168, 176–77, 178 (1984) (to similar effect); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
834–35 (1975) (implicitly contrasting the values of a technically superior but less
authentic non-consensual criminal defense); United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d
553, 559 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 163
(2000)).
6
See, e.g., Chevron USA, Inc. v. Echazabel, 536 U.S. 73, 85 (2002) (the
ADA (disability) statute as intended to combat “workplace paternalism”); Class
v. Towson Univ., 806 F.3d 236, 256 (4th Cir. 2015) (Wynn, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (to similar effect).
7
See, e.g., DeNunzio v. DeNunzio, 128 A.3d 901, 907–11 (Conn. 2016)
(discussing the role and limits of explicitly considering the “best interests,” as
well as any expressed preferences, of the relevant party in appointing a conservator or guardian).
8
See, e.g., NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. N.Y. State Office of Parks, Recreation,
& Historic Preserv., 125 A.D.3d 105, 109 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (discussing the
roles of personal autonomy in the context of a public park smoking ban).
9
See, e.g., William Weinbaum, New York bans smokeless tobacco at Yankee
Stadium, Citi Field, ESPN (Apr. 6, 2016), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/151
49390/.
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kinds of drinks;10 restaurant calorie disclosures;11 mandated efficiency standards and incentives for light bulbs and other energyconsuming products;12 vehicle fuel economy standards;13 low-flow
lumbing;14 the commodification and sale of body parts;15 and pros10
See, e.g., N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v.
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538, 541 (N.Y. 2014) (focusing on fluid ounce limitations on some sugary drinks in some venues); Sugar
tax: what does it mean, which drinks will be affected, and will it work?, THE
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 17, 2016 7:56 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/food-anddrink/news/sugar-tax-what-does-it-mean-and-who-will-be-affected/ (noting, inter alia, the unpopularity of a sugary drink tax in France and a Norwegian tax on
chocolate).
11
See, e.g., One-Year Countdown to Calorie Counts on Menus Starts Next
Week, CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Apr. 29, 2016), www.csp
inet.org/new/201604292.html (regarding an FDA disclosure requirement affecting many restaurant menus and menu boards).
12
For a brief account, see How the Energy Independence and Security Act of
2007 Affects Light Bulbs, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.go
v/cfl/how-energy-independence-and-security-act-2007-affects-light-bulb (last up
dated Oct. 15, 2015). See also Tyler Wells Lynch, Your Next Fridge Will Be Mor
e Efficient. Here’s Why, REVIEWED.COM (Sept. 16, 2014), http://refrigerators.revi
ewed.com/features/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-new-energy-starfridge-standards. For an introduction to the broader Energy Star consumer and
commercial mandate and incentives program, see Certified Products: Energy Savings at Home, ENERGY STAR, https://www.energystar.gov/products (last visited
Apr. 14, 2016).
13
See, e.g., John Lippert & Jeff Plungis, Auto industry’s fuel economy goals
are in trouble, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Jan. 13, 2016, 9:32 AM), http://www.autone
ws.com/article/20160113/OEM11/160119838/autoindustrys-fuel-economy-goal
s-are-in-trouble. More dramatically, see Alex Hern, Netherlands moots electric
car future with petrol and diesel ban by 2025, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 18, 2016,
10:09 EDT), www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/18/netherlands-parliament-electric-car-petrol-diesel-ban-by-2025.
14
See, e.g., Melody Gutierrez, California drought: Toilets, faucets sold in ‘16
must be low-flow, SFGATE, www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/California-drought
(last updated April 9, 2015, 10:25 AM).
15
For discussion, see, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND
OTHER THINGS 8, 21 (1996); Stephen Ashley Mortinger, Spleen for Sale: Moore
v. Regents of the University of California and the Right to Sell Parts of Your Body,
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 499, 500–14 (1990); Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the
Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 453–56 (2000). For the suggestion that it is
not the buying and selling itself that may be objectionable, see JASON BRENNAN
& PETER M. JAWORSKI, MARKETS WITHOUT LIMITS: MORAL VIRTUES AND
COMMERCIAL INTERESTS 206–07 (2016). Markets may well, however, facilitate
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titution in various contexts.16
Discussions of the proper role of legal paternalism have long focused on competing fundamental principles, perhaps followed by
attempts to apply such fundamental principles in particular contexts
and cases.17 This Article suggests, however, that we are entering into
a period in which debate over fundamental principles regarding legal paternalism will gradually go into eclipse, and attention to various narrower, more detailed problems of practical and contextualized application will increase in prominence. This Article does not
endorse or oppose any version of legal paternalism or libertarianism.
Rather, its purpose is to question the current practical significance
of any broadly principled endorsement of or opposition to legal paternalism.
This Article begins by briefly illustrating some typical understandings of the idea of paternalism, particularly in legal contexts,18

and more broadly legitimize the perhaps objectionable further exchange of some
good or service. See id. at 206.
16
See, e.g., PETER DE MARNEFFE, LIBERALISM AND PROSTITUTION 4–11
(2009) [hereinafter DE MARNEFFE, LIBERALISM]; Peter de Marneffe, Vice Laws
and Self-Sovereignty, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 29, 30–31 (2013) [hereinafter de Marneffe, Vice Laws] (seeking to distinguish between decriminalization and legalization); Michelle Madden Dempsey, How to Argue About Prostitution, 6 CRIM. L.
& PHIL. 65, 66–67 (2012) (noting the availability of various forms of both decriminalization and legalization).
17
Early in The Republic, the character of Socrates notes the moral problem
of withholding a borrowed weapon from its rightful, but perhaps judgment-impaired, owner. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC BOOK I, 331c (C.D.C. Reeve trans.,
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1992) (~380 BCE). Whether a refusal to return the weapon
under such circumstances should count as a case of paternalism, or instead as nonpaternalistically protecting the safety of non-consenting third parties, is a recurring conceptual and evidentiary issue. See infra Section IV. More recently, see,
e.g., Steven Lee, On the Justification of Paternalism, 7 SOC. THEORY & PRAC.
193, 193 (1981) (“[T]he justification of paternalism is usually seen in terms of a
clash of opposing moral principles.”).
18
See infra Section II. Just for the sake of getting the discussion off the
ground, we can preliminarily think of paternalism as “interference with a person’s
liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good,
happiness, needs, interests, or values of the person being coerced.” Gerald
Dworkin, Paternalism, in MILL’S ON LIBERTY: CRITICAL ESSAYS 61, 62 (Gerald
Dworkin ed., 1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, MILL’S ON LIBERTY]. Virtually every
element of this definition can be contested, including its ruling out of non-coercive
or libertarian paternalism. See generally infra Section II.
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along with closely associated ideas of personal autonomy,19 and initially addresses the diminishing significance of matters of basic
principle in contemporary discussions of legal paternalism.20 The
increasing number and variety of distinct understandings of both legal paternalism and autonomy require debate over preliminary issues of definition before any principle can be applied in any context.21
Four additional major factors then jointly help to account for the
eclipse of basic principle in contemporary discussions of legal paternalism. First, the underlying grounds and logic of the most traditionally crucial form of autonomy have, to many current observers,
increasingly seemed suspect.22 As belief in this fullest and most crucial sense of autonomy gradually fades, the most important broadly
principled grounds for objecting to legal paternalism must eventually fade with it.23 Problems of practical implementation, of circumstance, and of particular context then naturally loom larger.
Second, our health insurance, health care systems, and other relevant institutions continue to evolve in broadly social, more intensively collective, less individualized directions.24 Against this background, any distinction between self-regarding conduct that affects
the actor and other-regarding conduct that affects unconsenting third
parties becomes increasingly blurry, shifting, and even arbitrary.25
As the self- versus other-regarding conduct distinction continues to
blur, the realm of justified paternalism may tend to expand or to narrow, but more crucially, to blur in many contexts, even into unworkability and incoherence.26 Where the crucial boundary lines become
increasingly blurred, the real significance of any related basic principle is thereby unavoidably reduced.27

19

See infra Section II.
See infra Sections III, VI.
21
See generally Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHIL. Section 2 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism (last updated Jun. 19,
2016) [hereinafter Dworkin, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA].
22
See infra Section III.
23
See id.
24
See infra Section IV.
25
See id.
26
See id.
27
See id.
20
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Third, the proper scope of legal paternalism is increasingly seen
as a matter not so much of basic principle, or the clash of opposing
basic principles, but of the accumulating evidence and significance
of cognitive and other biases, fallacies, pathologies, and systematic
irrationalities in decision making.28 Such evidence of systematic
bias applies not merely to the decision making of generally competent adult decision makers in their personal capacity, but in some
forms to government officials and government bodies in a position
to adopt, implement, or reject legally paternalistic policies.29 The
case for legal paternalism thus increasingly depends not on broad
principle, but on contextualized comparisons of degrees and forms
of various personal and institutional biases and irrationalities.30
Fourth, and more broadly, the number, variety, and significance
of conceptual, statistical, and evidentiary complications has increased the frequency with which the cases for and against legal paternalism turn not on basic principles, but on just such complex, particularized, technical considerations.31 Human intentions, competencies, and values are complex matters, as are the various actual
results of many anti-paternalistic policies.32 Such complications
may often be difficult to work through in advance. But we cannot
responsibly resolve today’s questions of legal paternalism primarily
by appeal to any purported basic principles, while downplaying crucially relevant, if also murkier and more arid, technical complications.
The force of all of these considerations is then illustrated below
in a controversial subject matter area one might think most likely to
be governed by disputes over basic principle: that of assisted suicide
and related emerging statutory and case law.33 Even in the controversial assisted suicide context, however, it turns out that the debates
decreasingly reflect conflicting basic principles, and increasingly reflect the narrower subtleties, complications, and uncertainties inherent in the various relevant technical issues.34
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

See infra Section V.
See id.
See id.
See infra Section VI.
See id.
See infra Section VII.
See generally id.
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I. VARIETIES OF LEGAL PATERNALISM AND THE CONFLICTING
MEANINGS OF AUTONOMY
The ideas of paternalism in general, and of paternalism in the
legal realm in particular, are notoriously difficult to pin down.35 It
has been said that “there are as many competing conceptions of paternalism as there are authors . . . .”36 This Article will therefore not
commit to any specific definition of paternalism, or of legal paternalism in particular, to the exclusion of other mainstream definitions. A merely general understanding of the concept of paternalism
will instead allow for more comprehensive conclusions. A sufficient
sense of the idea of paternalism, as well as of some of the important
conceptual conflicts, can be drawn from a brief survey of some
prominent attempts at a definition of paternalism.
One recent survey of definitions of paternalism, for example,
finds three more or less standard components.37 These three components are said to involve, respectively, interference with individual
freedom, an intention to promote the good of the individual interfered with, and the absence of consent by the person whose freedom
is to be interfered with.38 These may initially seem to be uncontroversial considerations. But it is not clear, for example, that putting a
bequest in a trust, with paternalistic restrictions,39 or paternalistically hiding one’s own potentially dangerous prescription drug,40 interferes with the freedom or autonomy of the person who is being
treated paternalistically.
35
David J. Garren, Paternalism, Part I, 47 PHIL. BOOKS 334, 340 (2006)
[hereinafter Paternalism, Part I]
36
Id.; see also David J. Garren, Paternalism, Part II, 48 PHIL. BOOKS 50, 52
(2007) [hereinafter Paternalism, Part II].
37
See JULIAN LEGRAND & BILL NEW, GOVERNMENT PATERNALISM: NANNY
STATE OR HELPFUL FRIEND? 2 (2015).
38
See id.
39
See David Enoch, What’s Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and
Action, 136 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 21, 22 (2016) (discussing related paternalistic behavior that does not involve intrusion on an individual’s autonomy).
40
See Gerald Dworkin, Defining Paternalism, in PATERNALISM: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 25, 27 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2013) [hereinafter
Dworkin, Defining Paternalism]. The linkages between paternalism and autonomy, in one sense or another, are explored infra Section II. More broadly, it has
been argued that “[p]aternalism need not involve coercion, lying, deception or the
clear infraction of moral rules.” David Archard, For Our Own Good, 72
AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 283, 289 (1994).
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As well, some paternalistic laws, as in the case of prohibiting the
commercial manufacture of recreational alcohol, are clearly intended to benefit not the regulated would-be manufacturer, but the
eventual consumer of alcohol.41 There are also cases in which the
affected party welcomes and consents to a paternalistic legal regulation, perhaps for fear that its current will to follow its own most
fundamental goals would otherwise weaken over time.42
One of the leading writers in this area, Professor Gerald
Dworkin, defines paternalism as the “interference of a state or an
individual with another person, against their will, and defended or
motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better
off or protected from harm.”43 For our purposes, we again need not
object to this or any other reasonable formulation, but Dworkin’s
formulation raises new and additional controversies.44
Among such controversies is whether to define paternalism in
normatively unattractive or more neutral terms.45 Should we think
negatively of paternalism merely by definition?46 All else equal, it
would seem, “interference”47 with persons, or “usurpation”48 of their

41

See Dworkin, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at Section 2.4. For discussion, see Steven Lee, On the Justification of Paternalism, 7 SOC. THEORY &
PRAC. 193, 194 (1981).
42
See Dworkin, MILL’S ON LIBERTY, supra note 18, at 75. For related discussion, see generally Dennis J. Baker, The Moral Limits of Consent as a Defense
in the Criminal Law, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 93 (2009). For a prohibition on a
challenge to a duel, see Ward v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W. 786, 786–87 (Ky.
1909).
43
Dworkin, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21. For discussion of similar
assumptions, see Rosemary Carter, Justifying Paternalism, 7 CAN. J. PHIL. 133,
133 (1977) (“[A] paternalistic act apparently violates a subject’s right to non-interference . . . .”).
44
See generally Dworkin, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at Section
2.
45
See Emma C. Bullock, A Normatively Neutral Definition of Paternalism,
65 PHIL. Q. 1, 1–2 (2015).
46
See id. at 3 (noting that some definitions of paternalism tend to imply that
it is morally wrong).
47
See Dworkin, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21.
48
See David Archard, Paternalism Defined, 50 ANALYSIS 36, 36 (1990) (“Paternalism is essentially the usurpation of one person’s choice of their own good
by another person.”). See also Bernard Gert & Charles M. Culver, The Justification of Paternalism, 89 ETHICS 199, 199 (1979) [hereinafter Gert & Culver, The
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rights, liberties, and authority, should be avoided. But there may be
costs to making all paternalism at least prima facie wrong merely by
definition.49 So there have been attempts to define paternalism in
normatively more neutral terms.50
More substantively, it is again far from clear that all paternalism
occurs against the will51 of the person treated paternalistically. Some
cases of paternalism seem instead to take place not contrary to the
person’s will, but regardless of that will, which may not yet have
been formed, may have been manipulated, or may coincidentally
happen to be compatible with the paternalistic constraint that would
have been imposed.52 An otherwise paternalistic act may not lose its
paternalistic quality merely because the person being treated paternalistically has not yet made up her mind on the matter at hand, or
even happens, perhaps unknown to the party imposing the paternalistic judgment, to coincidentally agree with what she would in any
case be required to do.53 And then, even if we can settle upon a basic
definition of paternalism, or of legal paternalism in particular,54 we
Justification of Paternalism] (paternalism as involving the violation of a moral
rule).
49
See Bullock, supra note 45, at 3–5.
50
See id. at 5.
51
Richard J. Arneson, Nudge and Shove, 41 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 668, 669
(2015) (“[P]aternalism is [a] restriction of an individual’s liberty or [a] manipulation of his choice-making, against that individual’s will, motivated by the aim of
benefiting the individual.”); see also Dworkin, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note
21, at Section 2. The point of paternalistically manipulating someone, however,
may be to avoid or prevent any conflicts with that person’s will. See Arneson,
supra, at 671. A government may be unaware of the regulated party’s will, or no
relevant will may yet have been developed. See, e.g., Daniel Groll, Paternalism,
Respect, and the Will, 122 ETHICS 692, 698–99 (2012) (identifying other instances
where the paternalizer acts without knowledge of individual’s will or where the
individual has “no will”). Professor Dworkin, it should be noted, also refers to
regulatory actions taken merely “without the consent” of the person being treated
paternalistically. See Dworkin, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at Section
2.
52
Gert & Culver, The Justification of Paternalism, supra note 48, at 199 (the
paternalistic act as undertaken “independently” of any possible past, present, or
future consent by the party being treated paternalistically); see also, e.g., Groll,
supra note 51, at 698.
53
Professor Groll refers to this as the “Accidental Concordance” problem.
See Groll, supra note 51, at 698.
54
Another leading theorist, Professor Joel Feinberg, suggests that legal paternalism “justifies state coercion to protect individuals from self-inflicted harm,
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then face an expanding array of conceptual problems and complications.
First among such conceptual complications, we must ask
whether paternalism must be targeted at steering someone’s behavior—at that person doing or not doing something—or whether paternalism can be aimed merely at promoting someone’s desired state
of mind or belief.55 Can there be, for example, genuinely paternalistic government manipulation merely of attitudes or beliefs, and not
of anyone’s behavior?
Second, we must ask whether paternalism is more a matter of
the intent of the person acting paternalistically, or instead of some
effect on the person being treated paternalistically.56 A serious complication for legal paternalism in particular is that legislating bodies
may have no ascertainable single intent in imposing a rule.57 Intent
can be multiple, vague, unascertainable, or even self-contradictory.58 To the extent that we cannot determine a multi-member legislative body’s distinct primary intent, the existence of any intent
necessary for legal paternalism will be unclear.59
Third, we must ask whether a government in particular could
treat the public paternalistically, and perhaps disrespectfully, even
in the course of addressing the public solely with unthreatening and

or in its extreme version, to guide them, whether they like it or not, toward their
own good.” Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CAN. J. PHIL. 105, 105 (1971)
[hereinafter Feinberg, Legal Paternalism]. Professor Feinberg thus assumes, controversially, that legal paternalism, if not paternalism more generally, must involve coercion, thereby excluding a range of state nudges, incentives, mild inducements, and publicity campaigns insofar as they fall short of coercion. See id.
We here set aside any problems in distinguishing avoiding harms and promoting
one’s good.
55
See Bernard Gert & Charles M. Culver, Paternalistic Behavior, 6 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 45, 46–47 (1976) (discussing arguably paternalistic lies to dying patients and to others whose behavior is not likely to be affected either way).
56
See Paternalism, Part I, supra note 35, at 335 (noting the murkiness of the
distinction).
57
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994); see also Nicolas Cornell,
A Third Theory of Paternalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1295, 1313 (2015) (“It is . . .
notoriously difficult to ascribe a single intention to a law or other government
action.”).
58
See generally Easterbrook, supra note 57, at 68–70.
59
See Cornell, supra note 57, at 1313.
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purely rational arguments.60 We might well think of rational argumentation as the very opposite of paternalism.61 But, could rational
argumentation ever take on a paternalistic character?62 Consider, for
example, a government’s tedious, unrelenting, time-and-attentionconsuming, and perhaps distracting campaign for some behavioral
change, conducted in rational but demeaning and patronizing logical
steps and language.63
Fourth, we must ask about the many cases in which the effects
of the policy or rule in question are apparently mixed, in the sense
that they are to some degree paternalistic, and to some degree nonpaternalistic.64 In a typical such case, a legal prohibition may be intended to somehow benefit both the person being treated paternalistically and, to one degree or another, other non-consenting persons
affected by the conduct of the party being treated paternalistically.65
We shall see below66 that even if the classic distinction between selfregarding actions and other-regarding actions, however subtly qualified or interpreted, was ever useful, under our current regulatory
circumstances, the distinction is now typically useless.
Fifth, we must ask whether any viable distinction can be drawn
between paternalism that affects or is intended to affect the ends,
goals, values, and priorities held by the person being treated paternalistically, and paternalism that affects—entirely or primarily—the
means chosen by that person in pursuing their ends, goals, values,
and priorities.67 To simplify a bit, can a distinction be maintained
between paternalism toward a person’s ends and paternalism toward
that person’s means?68
60

See George Tsai, Rational Persuasion as Paternalism, 42 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 78, 79 (2014).
61
See Danny Scoccia, The Right to Autonomy and the Justification of Hard
Paternalism, in PATERNALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 74, 76 (Christian Coons
& Michael Weber eds., 2013) [hereinafter Scoccia, The Right to Autonomy].
62
See generally Tsai, supra note 60, at 79 (introducing his argument that rational persuasion can be paternalistic).
63
See generally Tsai, supra note 60, at 78–79.
64
See, e.g., Dworkin, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at Section 2.4
(discussing “pure” and “impure” paternalism).
65
See id.
66
See infra Section IV.
67
See Dworkin, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at Sections 2.3–2.4.
68
See, e.g., David Birks, Moral Status and the Wrongness of Paternalism, 40
SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 483, 487 (2014). For further elaboration, see infra Section
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Sixth and finally, we must consider the murky and evolving relationships between paternalism on the one hand and various forms
of autonomy on the other.69 It is often assumed that some form of
autonomy, and the value of autonomy, are central to an understanding of paternalism and its permissible role.70 Paternalism is often
assumed to limit autonomy.71 It might well be that paternalism can
restrict autonomy in one respect while increasing it in another respect.72 Often, though, it is said that paternalism is wrong when it
violates or interferes with the autonomy of the person being treated
paternalistically.73
Discussions of paternalism, taken collectively, thus involve
more than one distinct sense of the idea of autonomy.74 Our notions
of autonomy have evolved over time.75 Crucially, for our purposes
the particular sense of the idea of autonomy at stake in any discussion of paternalism often partially determines the nature, content,
and outcome of that discussion.76

VI. An additional, equally murky distinction is sometimes attempted between paternalism that affects the welfare, well-being, or happiness of the person being
treated paternalistically, and paternalism that affects only the moral status or
moral character of that person. See Dworkin, supra note 21, at Section 2.5. We
also mainly set aside issues of so-called self-paternalism and voluntary precommitment. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 37–47 (1984) [hereinafter ULYSSES AND THE
SIRENS]; JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY,
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 4 (2000) [hereinafter ULYSSES UNBOUND].
69
See Enoch, supra note 39, at 46.
70
See id. at 47 (“[W]e can make progress on the discussion of paternalism . . .
by better understanding the value of autonomy and its related constraints”).
71
See, e.g., Dworkin, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at 2 (“[Paternalism] involves some kind of limitation on the freedom or autonomy of some
agent . . . .”).
72
See infra Section VI.
73
See Birks, supra note 68, at 483; see also Danny Scoccia, In Defense of
Hard Paternalism, 27 L. & PHIL. 351, 351, 351 n.1 (2008) [hereinafter In Defense
of Hard Paternalism] (listing opponents of autonomy-violating paternalism).
74
See, e.g., Birks, supra note 68, at 484, 484 n.3 (highlighting two kinds of
autonomy objections to paternalism and stating that there are “numerous accounts” of autonomy that may be considered in cases of paternalism).
75
See generally John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, THE STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Mar. 21, 2015), http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/spr2015/entries/autonomgy-moral.
76
See Birks, supra note 68, at 484 n.3.
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In the past, discussions of paternalism and of its proper role have
tended to focus on matters of basic principle only when autonomy—
in what we will below call the fullest sense—is at stake.77 When
autonomy in a more modest sense is the only form of autonomy
thought to be at stake in a given context, discussions of autonomy’s
proper role typically then focus less on issues of basic principle, and
more on matters such as detailed empirical evidence, subtle conceptual analysis, and complex calculations and balancing.78 Our thesis
in this regard is that autonomy in the fullest sense is gradually losing
its credibility and appeal with today’s theorists and decision makers,
leaving only more modest, less ambitious forms of autonomy in
play. This tendency means that discussions of paternalism will increasingly focus on matters of detailed, contextualized, and particularized investigation, rather than appeal to basic principles.
Very roughly, autonomy in the fullest, most ambitious sense focuses on the idea of a will that is capable of genuine agency.79 Such
a will is capable of being moved by apparently good and bad reasons, including principles.80 Such a will would crucially differ from
a will that is instead moved by any combination of internal or external physical causes, including random physical events of the sort
investigated by the sciences.81 A will that reflects merely some combination of randomness, current or past bodily or physical circumstances, and any set of biological or other physical laws, would thus
not qualify as autonomous in the fullest sense.82
Even at this point, we can begin to sense why autonomy in the
fullest sense might be more closely linked to basic principles, to fundamental values, and to the idea of inviolability than autonomy in a
lesser sense. Autonomy in the fullest sense is historically linked to
writers such as Immanuel Kant,83 who, not surprisingly, emphasizes
the role of principle in discussions of paternalism.84 Autonomy in a
77

See infra Section III.
See Christman, supra note 75.
79
See generally Stephen Darwall, The Value of Autonomy and Autonomy of
the Will, 116 ETHICS 263, 281–82 (2006).
80
See id.
81
See id.
82
See id.
83
See infra Section III.
84
This is not to suggest that Kant ignores particular circumstance and context
in making moral judgments.
78
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lesser sense may, in the end, reduce to something like the absence
of some disfavored set of socially-imposed or psychological obstacles to attaining what we desire. Autonomy in a lesser sense tends
to be more broadly political than metaphysical. The value of autonomy in such a lesser sense may, at bottom, reflect merely something
like a preference for some particular causes of our decisions, and for
non-frustration over the experience of frustration.
Not surprisingly, then, the nature and status of autonomy has of
late been widely discussed.85 Autonomy in a lesser, mostly social or
political sense, akin to valued social and political freedom, is doubt-

85

See, e.g., ANDREW SNEDDON, AUTONOMY 122–23 (2013) (ebook) (distinguishing between “autonomy of choice” and “autonomy of person”); Gerald
Dworkin, The Concept of Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 54, 61 (John Christman ed., 1989) [hereinafter Concept
of Autonomy] (autonomy as authenticity plus procedural independence in decision-making); GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY
108 (1988) [hereinafter DWORKIN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY ] (defining autonomy as “the capacity to reflect upon one’s motivational structure and
to make changes in that structure.”); Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, in THE INNER
CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY, supra, at 27, 32 [hereinafter Feinberg, Autonomy] (“To the degree to which a person is autonomous he is not merely
the mouthpiece of other persons or forces” as distinct from the degree to which
one exhibits authenticity); MARK D. WHITE, THE MANIPULATION OF CHOICE:
ETHICS AND LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 84 (2013) (discussing John Stuart Mill’s
anti-paternalism as based on autonomy in the sense of “the right to determine
one’s own interests and actions.”); R.S. Downie & Elizabeth Telfer, Autonomy,
46 PHIL. 293, 293 (1971) (“An agent is sometimes said to be autonomous in virtue
of his capacity to choose what to do, whether he will do X or refrain.”); Marina
Oshana, How Much Should We Value Autonomy?, 20 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 99, 100
(2003) (understanding personal autonomy as “the condition of being self-directed,
of having authority over one’s choices and actions whenever these are significant
to the direction of one’s life.”); Robert Young, Autonomy and the ‘Inner Self’, 17
AM. PHIL. Q. 35, 35 (1980) (distinguishing autonomy from a mindless, imitative
adoption of the opinions and values of others that reflects freedom, but not autonomy in the sense necessary for genuine agency, real responsibility, and fundamental dignity); Thomas Hurka, Why Value Autonomy?, 13 SOC. THEORY & PRAC.
361, 361 (1987) (“To be autonomous, on at least one understanding, is to direct
oneself where different directions are possible.”); see also Richard H. Fallon, Two
Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 875 (1994) (discussing autonomy in
the First Amendment context).
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less central to much of our most important constitutional jurisprudence.86 Given the overall variety of meanings of both paternalism
and autonomy, it is not surprising that there is some uncertainty as
to the relationships in legal practice between paternalism and autonomy.87 But as a first approximation, paternalism and autonomy have
been thought to commonly conflict in ways classically noted by Wilhelm von Humboldt,88 John Stuart Mill,89 and by contemporary
writers.90 Crucially, the significance we attach to any relationship
between paternalism and autonomy will depend not only on context,
but on whether we believe that autonomy in the fullest sense is at
stake, or only autonomy in some less ambitious sense. Adopting the
idea of autonomy in the fullest sense, as developed by writers such
86
See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (extending
fundamental constitutional liberties “to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression,
and certain intimate conduct.”); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992) (describing “choices central to personal dignity and autonomy” as “central
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
87
At least since the time of Rousseau, some have wondered whether someone
can be forced to be free, or autonomous. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT OR PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT 113 (Henry J. Trozer
trans., Swan Sonnenschein & Co. 1895) (1762); Neil Levy, Forced to be Free?
Increasing Patient Autonomy by Constraining It, 40 J. MED. ETHICS 293, 300
(2014). Some have argued that certain instances of paternalism may respect, or
enhance and increase, autonomy overall. See, e.g., Levy, supra, at 298–300; Cass
R. Sunstein, Nudging and Choice Architecture: Ethical Considerations, YALE J.
REG. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Nudging]; Cass R. Sunstein, Requiring Active
Choosing is a Form of Paternalism, HARV. JOHN M. OLIN DISCUSSION PAPER
SERIES, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/782_Sunstein.php [hereinafter Requiring Active Choosing]; Donald
VanDeVeer, Autonomy Respecting Paternalism, 6 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 187,
199–204 (1980); Martin Binder & Leonhard K. Lades, Autonomy-Enhancing Paternalism, 68 KYKLOS 3, 3–4 (2015).
88
See WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT, THE LIMITS OF STATE ACTION 11–15 (J.W.
Burrow ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1969) (1852).
89
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 129 (Michael B. Mathias ed., Pearson Educ. Inc. 2007) (1859).
90
See SNEDDON, supra note 85, at 119 (“Autonomy is at the root of the moral
problem of paternalism”); Dan W. Brock, Paternalism and Autonomy, 98 ETHICS
550, 550 (1988) (“[T]here has been substantial interest in the conflict between
autonomy and paternalism . . . .” ); Danny Scoccia, Paternalism and Respect for
Autonomy, 100 ETHICS 318, 318 (1990) [hereinafter Scoccia, Paternalism].
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as Immanuel Kant,91 may well lead some persons to endorse a basic
principle directly limiting or even precluding paternalism in a broad
range of cases. Autonomy in a lesser sense that is typically focused
on particular favored and disfavored causes of action and barriers to
action, however, tends to neither support nor oppose paternalism as
a matter of principle. Autonomy in this lesser sense tends to appear
only as one consideration among others in discussions of the proper
role of paternalism.
The claim that autonomy in the fullest, Kantian sense is real and
viable and is often at stake in typical cases has recently come under
attack.92 As we see immediately below, it is increasingly thought
that anything like full Kantian autonomy depends upon unsupported
metaphysical claims and bad science.93 Given this erosion of belief
in full Kantian autonomy, we should expect the idea of autonomy to
gradually play a more limited role in discussion of legal paternalism,
rather than a role at the level of broad principle. These trends are
illustrated in Section III below.
II. KANTIAN FULL AUTONOMY, ITS CONTEMPORARY CRITICS, AND
THE ECLIPSE OF AUTONOMY AS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE
Immanuel Kant was not the first writer to emphasize human autonomy in a robust sense, or to link autonomy to the most fundamental sense of human dignity.94 Kant’s discussion of autonomy
serves well, however, in illustrating how our understanding of autonomy is today becoming increasingly diluted and less deeply
meaningful. In particular, Kant famously holds that
[w]ill is a kind of causality belonging to living beings
so far as they are rational. Freedom [or autonomy]
would then be the property this causality [of reason]
has of being able to work independently of determination by alien [or any physical or biological] causes;

91

See infra Section III.
See id.
93
See generally id.
94
See, e.g., GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN 5
(Charles Glenn Wallis et al. trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1965) (1486) (describing a person as his own “maker and molder” and as able to “have that which he
chooses and to be that which he wills”).
92
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just as natural necessity is a property characterizing
the causality of all non-rational beings . . . .95
Autonomy is in turn crucially “the ground of the dignity of human nature”96 in the most fundamental sense in which dignity is relevant to questions of paternalism.97 The exercise of Kantian autonomy, the ground of fundamental dignity, is thus incompatible with
decision making that results from any combination of randomness
and natural or physical causation.98
95

IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 114
(H.J. Paton trans., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 1964) (emphasis omitted)
[hereinafter KANT, GROUNDWORK]; see also id. (“What else then can freedom of
will be but autonomy—that is, the property which will has of being a law to itself?”); see also id. at 116 (“Reason must look upon itself as the author of its own
principles independently of alien [including biological] influences.”).
96
Id. at 103; see also PAUL GUYER, KANT ON FREEDOM, LAW, AND
HAPPINESS 97 (2000) (quoting Kant).
97
See, e.g., BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT 203
(1993) (“The ‘worth beyond price [or dignity]’ of the Kantian agent is in her autonomous will.”); THOMAS E. HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN
KANT’S MORAL THEORY 178 (1992) [hereinafter HILL, DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL
REASON] (“The dignity which Kant ascribes to all persons as ‘ends in themselves’
is said to be grounded in their autonomy of will . . . .”); see also GUYER, supra
note 96, at 9 (stating that, for Kant, “autonomy has a dignity that is incomparable
to the value we place on any particular object of desire . . . .”); Thomas May, The
Concept of Autonomy, 31 AM. PHIL. Q. 133, 133 (1994) (“Since . . . Immanuel
Kant, autonomy has become nearly synonymous with human dignity and an imminent value in any system which purports to take seriously respect for persons.”).
98
For discussion, see CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM
OF ENDS 25 (1996) (“The will is the causality of a rational being. If the will’s . . .
decisions are determined by the laws of nature, it is not a free [or autonomous]
will.”); THOMAS E. HILL, JR., AUTONOMY AND SELF-RESPECT 29 (1991) [hereinafter HILL, AUTONOMY AND SELF-RESPECT] (“To have a will is to be able to cause
events in accord with principles . . . .To have autonomy it is also necessary that
one’s will be free in a negative sense. This implies that one is capable of causing
events without being causally determined to do so.”) (emphasis omitted). Free
will and autonomy for Kant thus require that the will be able “to act in complete
independence of any prior or concurrent causes other than our own will or practical reasoning . . . .” ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT’S MORAL THEORY 46
(1989); see also ONORA O’NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS
OF KANT’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 52 (1989); Candace Cummins Gauthier,
Philosophical Foundations of Respect for Autonomy, 3 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS
J. 21, 23 (1993); Paul Guyer, Kant on the Theory and Practice of Autonomy, in
AUTONOMY 70, 76 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2003); Thomas E. Hill, Jr.,
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Typically, but not exclusively,99 of late, the credibility of this
robust Kantian sense of autonomy has been called into serious question, or indeed decisively rejected.100 An important element of this
trend toward abandoning full Kantian autonomy has been the increasing popularity, particularly among scientists and philosophers
of science, of one version or another of what we might call physicalism or materialism.101 Materialism in this sense maintains that
while there may seem to be non-material or non-physical things such
as conscious minds, continuing selves, thoughts, relationships,
loves, morals, and psychologies, everything is in reality either physical or inescapably dictated by the physical.102
Our concern herein is of course not with the truth or falsity of
materialism or any related doctrine,103 but with one effect of the
gradually increasing prominence of materialism. Thus, leading philosopher Thomas Nagel reports that “among the scientists and philosophers who . . . express views about the natural order as a whole,

Kantian Autonomy and Contemporary Ideas of Autonomy, in KANT ON MORAL
AUTONOMY 15, 20 (Oliver Sensen ed., 2013).
99
See, e.g., Juliën Offray de la Mettrie, Man a Machine, in THE PORTABLE
ENLIGHTENMENT READER 202, 203 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1995) (1747) (“Man
is . . . a complicated machine . . . .”). See also id. at 208. At roughly the same time,
Baron d’Holbach endorsed a similar materialism. See Michael LeBuffe, PaulHenri Thiry (Baron) d’Holbach, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. Section 2,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/holbach (last updated Oct. 22, 2014) (“Holbach
takes nature to consist in matter and motion and nothing else.”).
100
See infra notes 101–03, 108–16.
101
For clarification, see, e.g., Daniel Stoljar, Physicalism, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. Section 1, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism
(last updated Mar. 9, 2015) (“‘[M]aterialism’ and ‘physicalism’ are now often
interpreted as interchangeable.”).
102
See id.; See also William Jaworski, Why Materialism Is False, and Why It
Has Nothing to Do with the Mind, 91 PHIL. 183, 183 (2016) (“Materialism claims
that everything is physical; everything can be exhaustively described and explained in principle by physics.”); Jesse M. Mulder, A Vital Challenge to Materialism, 91 PHIL. 153, 153 (2016) (“One way to think of the problem of consciousness is via the question of how consciousness could just be a process like digestion . . . .”) (quoting Josh Weisberg, CONSCIOUSNESS 13 (2014)).
103
See, e.g., B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 25 (1971) (discussing the denial of autonomy).
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reductive materialism is widely assumed to be the only serious possibility.”104 At a somewhat more specific level, philosopher Mary
Midgley has referred to “the current tendency of many well-qualified scholars to claim . . . that they believe themselves . . . not to exist, selves having been apparently replaced by arrangements of brain
cells.”105
To what the former supposedly autonomous Kantian person is
thought to reduce actually varies. If not to the above “arrangements
of brain cells,”106 then perhaps to “enormously complicated biochemical machines,”107 “physical blobs,”108 “chemical scum,”109 “a
bag of chemicals,”110 “a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules,”111 “complex biological machines,”112 or to a multiplicity of “mindless robots.”113
If we are ultimately reducible to any of these entities, or to any
combination thereof, one implication is that autonomy in anything
like the robust Kantian sense becomes unattainable and indeed
104

THOMAS NAGEL, MIND AND COSMOS: WHY THE MATERIALIST NEODARWINIAN CONCEPTION OF NATURE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSE 4 (2012) (citing STEVEN WEINBERG, DREAMS OF A FINAL THEORY 51–64 (1992)).
105
MARY MIDGLEY, ARE YOU AN ILLUSION? vii (2014). For an enthusiastic
endorsement of this view, see Susan Blackmore, Living Without Free Will, in
EXPLORING THE ILLUSION OF FREE WILL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 161, 161–
63 (Gregg D. Caruso ed., 2013).
106
MIDGLEY, supra note 105, at vii.
107
Stephen M. Barr, Is the Human Mind Reducible to Physics? 1–2 (Lumen
Christi Inst., Apr. 2015), http://www.lumenchristi.org/wp/wp-content/uploads
/2015/04/Is-the-Human-Mind-Reducible-to-Physics.pdf (last visited Apr. 28,
2016).
108
VALERIE TIBERIUS, MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 16 (2015) (ebook).
109
DAVID DEUTSCH, THE FABRIC OF REALITY: THE SCIENCE OF PARALLEL
UNIVERSES—AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 177–78 (1997) (quoting Professor Stephen
Hawking); PAUL DAVIES, COSMIC JACKPOT: WHY OUR UNIVERSE IS JUST RIGHT
FOR LIFE 222 (2007) (same).
110
Anthony R. Cashmore, The Lucretian Swerve: The Biological Basis of Human Behavior and the Criminal Justice System, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.
4499, 4504 (2010), www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0915161107.
111
FRANCIS CRICK, THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH
FOR THE SOUL 3 (1994).
112
Joshua D. Greene, Social Neuroscience and the Soul’s Last Stand, in
SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE: TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE
SOCIAL MIND 263, 264 (Alexander Todorov et al. eds., 2011).
113
DANIEL C. DENNETT, FREEDOM EVOLVES 2 (2003).
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meaningless. As the contemporary physicist Carlo Rovelli asks,
“what does it mean, our being free to make decisions, if our behavior
does nothing but follow the predetermined laws of nature?”114
One answer to Professor Rovelli’s question is to concede that
such a view indeed lets the air out of the balloon of free will, robust
autonomy, and other typically valued capacities.115 Another is to try
to draw a meaningful line between causes that are operating outside
and inside the cranium, with only the latter somehow offering the
possibility of freedom.116 Yet another is, in full accordance with the
laws of nature, to endorse some of our desires and not others, in
accordance with an ordering or hierarchy of desires somehow naturally arrived at.117
Finally, one could set aside any interest in autonomy in a Kantian sense, and reduce the idea of autonomy to the level of society
and politics.118 Some natural, materialist causes of our choices and
behavior could then be largely taken for granted, while some other
such causes, deemed to be within the broad realm of politics, could
be judged to promote, respect, undermine, or violate our autonomy,
114

CARLO ROVELLI, SEVEN BRIEF LESSONS ON PHYSICS 72 (Simon Carnell &
Eric Segre trans., 2016) (1956). The philosopher Galen Strawson concludes,
“[f]or however self-consciously aware we are as we deliberate and reason, every
act and operation of our minds happens as it does as a result of features for which
we are ultimately in no way responsible.” Galen Strawson, The Impossibility of
Ultimate Responsibility?, in EXPLORING THE ILLUSION OF FREE WILL AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 41, 51 (Gregg D. Caruso, ed., 2013).
115
See Alex Rosenberg, Disenchanted Naturalism, in CONTEMPORARY
PHILOSOPHICAL NATURALISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 17, 17 (Bana Bashour &
Hans D. Muller eds., 2014).
116
See ROVELLI, supra note 114, at 71.
117
See HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT:
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 12 (1988) (“No animal other than man, however, appears
to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.”). For one neuroscientific response, see Gidon
Felsen & Peter B. Reiner, How the Neuroscience of Decision Making Informs Our
Conception of Autonomy, 2 AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 3, 6 (2011) (discussing a possible “regress problem” in creating a “hierarchy of desires”). For another “hierarchy” approach to autonomy, see DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
AUTONOMY, supra note 85, at 108 (“I am defining autonomy as the capacity to
reflect upon one’s motivational structure and to make changes in that structure.”).
118
See Veljko Dubljevic, Autonomy in Neuroethics: Political and Not Metaphysical, 4 AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 44, 44 (2013) (echoing the shift in John Rawls’s
interest from metaphysical to political accounts of justice).
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in whatever sense of the idea of autonomy remained.119 The idea of
autonomy would thus refer not to, say, the absence of barriers and
constraints on choosing in general, but to the absence of some or all
barriers and constraints that we somehow think of as social or
broadly political.120
For our purposes, however, the key point is that if we abandon
reliance on the full Kantian sense of autonomy, we should expect
that the sacrifices and tradeoffs we are willing to make on matters
of legal paternalism and autonomy will eventually be affected. We
can certainly define ideas such as autonomy, freedom, and dignity
as we wish. But on some definitions, it eventually becomes unclear
why we should be willing to pay any substantial price to uphold autonomy as thus understood. At some point, autonomy in a diluted,
non-Kantian sense is no longer able to draw upon the argumentative
logic, depth, and weight of its Kantian ancestor.121 And at that point,
debates over paternalism are steered not by accepting or rejecting
autonomy as a basic principle, but by a variable mix of contextual
and other non-basic considerations, with a diluted conception of autonomy appearing merely as one among many such considerations.122
As it turns out, and as we explore below, the role of principle in
debates over paternalism is also being further reduced for independent reasons. In particular, the evolving nature of an increasingly interdependent and increasingly interactive society has continually
eroded any workable distinction between actions that affect the actor
and consenting parties, and actions that affect unconsenting third
parties. We briefly consider the continuing eclipse of any such distinction below.

119

See generally id. at 46.
See generally id.
121
See id. at 44.
122
Thus from a pro-paternalist standpoint, it has recently been argued that autonomy, at least as understood by the writer, is “not all that valuable; not valuable
enough to offset what we lose by leaving people to their own autonomous
choices.” SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE
PATERNALISM 1 (2013).
120
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III. PATERNALISM AND THE INCREASING BLURRINESS OF THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN SELF- AND OTHER-REGARDING ACTIONS
Some distinction between actions that harm the actor and those
that harm other non-consenting persons is fundamental to legal paternalism. This distinction underlies the classically expressed belief
that “[t]he free man owns himself. He can damage himself with either eating or drinking; he can ruin himself with gambling. If . . . he
may not, he is not a free man any more than a dog.”123 The classic
attempt at this distinction is that of John Stuart Mill.124
Mill’s formulations of the distinction vary throughout On Liberty, 125 but he recognizes at several points that any such distinction
will, from a utilitarian standpoint,126 sometimes be difficult.127 We
will leave unresolved whether any refinements and qualifications ultimately allow us to redeem the initial difficulties of the distinction128 because our focus is instead on the gradually increasing difficulties of applying this crucial distinction in practice.
123

NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. N.Y. State Office of Parks, Recreation, & Historic
Preserv., 51 N.E.3d 512, 514 n.1 (N.Y. 2016) (quoting G.K. Chesterton in broadcast radio talk from June 11, 1935 regarding the smoking ban in public parks).
124
See JOHN GRAY, MILL ON LIBERTY: A DEFENCE 90 (2d ed., 1996) (“Hence,
all discussion about paternalism is logically or conceptually parasitic on the possibility of making a distinction analogous to that which Mill wishes to make between self-regarding and other-regarding actions.”). Mill himself attempts such a
distinction in various formulations. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 89, at 70–73.
125
See, e.g., MILL, supra note 89, at 70–73, 147–51. See also C.L. TEN, MILL
ON LIBERTY 11 (1980) (“Mill readily and explicitly admits that self-regarding
conduct affects others, and this admission is fatal to the traditional interpretation.”).
126
See MILL, supra note 89, at 77.
127
See id. at 151. Mill therein seeks, apparently on a utilitarian basis, to distinguish acts that directly, versus only indirectly, affect other people, while recognizing that “whatever affects himself, may affect others through himself . . . .”
Id. at 72. J.C. Rees attempted to clarify this distinction by interpreting Mill as
focusing not so much on the general effects of one’s actions on other persons, but
on the effects of one’s actions specifically on the interests of other persons. See
J.C. Rees, A Re-Reading of Mill On Liberty, in LIMITS OF LIBERTY: STUDIES OF
MILL’S ON LIBERTY 87, 93 (Peter Radcliff ed., 1966).
128
A leading contemporary of Mill, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, argued
simply that Mill “assumes that some acts regard the agent only, and that some
regard other people. In fact, by far the most important part of our conduct regards
both ourselves and others . . . .” JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY,
FRATERNITY AND THREE BRIEF ESSAYS 66 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1991) (1874).
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Particularly in the areas of health care law, health insurance and
other forms of insurance, public health measures, transportation and
the environment, and safety and well-being in general, our public
and private systems of provision have, over time, intensified and expanded our collective dependencies.129 The idealized individualism
of Thoreau130 and Emerson131 in the years prior to On Liberty have
increasingly given way to a more interconnected, even if stratified,
law and culture. Consider, for example, the perspective taken by Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., “I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of
all communities. . . . We are caught in an inescapable network of
mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one
directly, affects all indirectly.”132
Based on our historically evolving understanding, a person “can
damage himself with either eating or drinking,”133 but the damage
may then be considered as a covered pre-existing condition under
the Affordable Care Act.134 Typical health insurance coverage can
therefore neither be denied nor increased in price on this basis, even
if the health damage in question is classified as voluntarily risked or

129
For discussion at a more fundamental level, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES 8
(1999) (questioning what the proper role for individual autonomy is given our
unavoidable vulnerabilities and acknowledged dependencies).
130
See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 224
(Owen Thomas ed., W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1966) (1854).
131
See RALPH WALDO EMERSON, THE ESSAY ON SELF-RELIANCE 1–3 (The
Roycroft Shop 1905) (1841).
132
Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. while in Birmingham jail to his fellow
clergymen (Apr. 16, 1963), www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter-Birmingham.html.
133
NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. N.Y. State Office of Parks, Recreation, & Historic
Preserv., 51 N.E.3d 512, 514 n.1 (N.Y. 2016) (quoting G.K. Chesterton in broadcast radio talk from June 11, 1935 regarding the smoking ban in public parks).
134
See Pre-Existing Conditions, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/about-the-law/pre-existing-conditions/index.html
(last updated Nov. 18, 2014).
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incurred.135 Whatever refinements136 of Mill’s self-regarding versus
other-regarding conduct distinction we adopt, the distinction becomes increasingly blurry and elusive. The increasing blurriness,
contestability, and dubiousness of this line in turn diminishes the
scope of applicability of any broad, fundamental principle that allows for or rejects paternalism.137
The increased blurring of any line between self- and other-regarding actions is manifested in other legal subject-matter areas as
well. For example, there may once have been something of a legal
consensus that the private consumption of pornography produced by
and for consenting adults counted as a largely self-regarding activity, despite its harms. At this point, however, any such legal consensus is under increasing attack from various perspectives.138
Similar stories of increasingly blurry distinctions could be told
about negative externalities associated with prostitution between
adults,139 individual vehicle fuel emissions,140 particular quantities

135
See id.; see also Anthony N. DeMaria, The Nanny State and “Coercive
Paternalism”, 61 J. AM. C. OF CARDIOLOGY 2108, 2109 (2013) (“There is no
question that self-induced disease is common, largely preventable, and at the very
least an economic burden to society.”).
136
Attempting to distinguish primary or direct and immediate effects from
secondary or indirect effects may well allow persons to claim that not all of contemporary civic life falls into the category of other-regarding actions, and thus
outside the category of acts subject to paternalistic restriction. But the overall distinction has, in our society, become increasingly unclear. See, e.g., Rees, supra
note 127, at 92–93; see also STEPHEN, supra note 128, at 66.
137
See, e.g., STEPHEN, supra note 128, at 66.
138
See Lucy Westcott, Utah Becomes First State to Declare Pornography a
Public Health Hazard, NEWS WK. (Apr. 20, 2016 at 10:53 AM),
www.newsweek.com/Utah-porn-public-health-hazard-450223; S. Con. Res. 9,
61st Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016); see, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
ONLY WORDS 71–110 (1996); see also Gail Dines, Is porn immoral? That doesn’t
matter: It’s a public health crisis., WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2016), www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/04/08/is-porn-immoral. This increased
blurring may be related to a blurring of the distinction between the public and the
private realms.
139
For discussion, see DE MARNEFFE, LIBERALISM, supra note 16, at 7, 3–11;
see also Emily Bazelon, Should Prostitution Be a Crime?, N.Y. TIMES (May 5,
2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/magazine/should-prostitution-be-a-crime.
html?.
140
See Alex Hern, supra note 13.
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of some sugary drinks,141 smokeless tobacco in public places,142 injuries attributable to the failure to wear motorcycle helmets,143 and
non-vaccination against communicable diseases.144
In these and other contexts, appeals to any basic principles either
for or against legal paternalism are thus becoming less meaningful
and less credible. The various complications145 and costs of policy
alternatives, including their indirect and supposedly unanticipated
consequences, correspondingly begin to loom larger.146 But all of
the policy complications arise in the context of the increasing lack
of clarity over whether a given policy addresses self-regarding or

141

See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538, 541 (N.Y. 2014). See also
Sugar tax, supra note 10 (noting that “Norway taxes chocolate and sweets while
Finland and France tax sweetened drinks.”). The public policy prudence of imposing a tax on presumably heart-healthy dark chocolate could be contested.
142
See Weinbaum, supra note 9.
143
See, e.g., Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519, 1522 (11th Cir. 1989) (discussing Mill on paternalism, but noting that “the costs of this injury may be borne by
the public.”); Robotham v. State, 488 N.W.2d 533, 540–41 (Neb. 1992) (discussing more and less direct effects on the public interest of motorcycle helmet nonuse); Benning v. State, 641 A.2d 757, 762 (Vt. 1994) (noting that helmet non-use
“imposes great costs on the public.”).
144
See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (affirming state
court’s decision to allow forced vaccination of healthy adult, which was later cited
in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 55–56 (1905) as a proper use of police
powers); see also Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 544 (2d Cir. 2015)
(per curiam) (affirming district court’s decision allowing compulsory vaccination
statute to stand). For broader discussion, see generally MARK NAVIN, VALUES
AND VACCINE REFUSAL: HARD QUESTIONS IN ETHICS, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND
HEALTH CARE 74–77 (2016) (ebook) (noting the role of cognitive biases and distrust of experts).
145
For discussion of some such complications, broadly understood, see infra
Section VI.
146
On important unintended consequences of these policies, see M. Frederic
Bastiat, That Which is Seen, and That Which is Not Seen, in ESSAYS ON POLITICAL
ECONOMY 60–127 (London, A.W. Bennett) (1850); Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 AM. SOC. REV. 894, 894–
95 (1936); see, e.g., Peter de Marneffe, Avoiding Paternalism, 34 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 68, 94 (2006) (“[T]he case for and against these [arguably paternalistic] policies in their various forms is extremely complex, both normatively and empirically.”) [hereinafter de Marneffe, Avoiding Paternalism].
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other-regarding conduct, in whatever sense of this distinction we finally choose.147
Primary among these complications is that of the roles of individual, group, and official policy-making biases and pathologies in
decision-making. Questions of the proper role of legal paternalism
thus increasingly incorporate considerations of the decision-making
biases of persons potentially subject to legal paternalism, as well as
of those who might adopt or implement148 paternalistic policies. We
briefly survey several of these decision-making biases and pathologies immediately below.
IV. LEGAL PATERNALISM AND THE PATHOLOGIES OF INDIVIDUAL
AND OFFICIAL DECISION-MAKING
Whether to adopt any particular regulation involving legal paternalism increasingly incorporates a more or less careful assessment of the cognitive limitations and decision-making biases of the
potentially regulated parties.149 As of 1963, the legal philosopher H.
L. A. Hart referred to “a general decline in the belief that individuals
know their own interests best.”150 Any defectiveness in individual
prudential choice, however, can only be part of the story. An important complication is that decision-making competence has not
only a possible growth dimension, but a comparative dimension as

147

See de Marneffe, Avoiding Paternalism, supra note 1146, at 94 (noting
several areas in which supposedly paternalistic policies might be defensible on
grounds of protecting minors or other unconsenting third parties).
148
For background, see JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKY,
IMPLEMENTATION: HOW GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN
OAKLAND 173–74 (U.C. Press 3d ed. 1984).
149
See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Expert Paternalism, 64 FLA. L. REV. 721, 721
(2012). See also in the advertising regulation context, Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers,
Inc. v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 734 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 465–66 (1978)).
150
H. L. A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 32–33 (1963) (discussing
several common impediments to optimal choice).
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well.151 Wisdom and prudence specifically in public or governmental decision making also cannot be taken for granted.152
As though anticipating Hart, Jeremy Bentham classically observed that “[i]t is a standing topic of complaint, that a man knows
too little of himself. Be it so: but is it so certain that the legislator
must know more?”153 More recently, though, it has been argued in
response that “even when subject to similar biases, experts are relatively better decisionmakers than laypeople.”154 As it turns out, issues of possible growth in competence, and of the relative competencies of regulators and paternalistically regulated parties, are crucial in assessing the overall value of any paternalistic intervention.155
The systematic cognitive and other biases of decisionmakers
have of late generated substantial interest.156 From the standpoint of
legal paternalism, however, our increasingly detailed awareness of
the importance of various decision-making biases is not entirely
clear in its implications. For one thing, the various cognitive biases
may impose costs not only on the individual decisionmaker, but on
unconsenting third parties as well,157 such that it may no longer be
appropriate to think of the regulation in question as purely paternalistic. And for another, individual and group official policymakers

151
See generally Blumenthal, supra note 149, at 757 (explaining that in order
to determine the propriety of paternalistic intervention, both the individuals’ and
the experts’ respective decision-making abilities must be evaluated and compared).
152
See, e.g., id at 733–35 (discussing the benefits of decision-making by experts with substantive knowledge, skill or authority).
153
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 319
(Prometheus Books 1988) (1781).
154
Blumenthal, supra note 149, at 722.
155
See id. at 757.
156
See Gideon Keren & Karl H. Teigen, Yet Another Look at the Heuristics
and Biases Approach, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING 89, 99 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004) (“[O]ne of the more
popular textbooks on judgment and decision making . . . counts no less than 25
biases . . . .”).
157
See J.D. Trout, Paternalism and Cognitive Bias, 24 LAW & PHIL. 393, 393
(2005) (the cognitive biases are “not just personally costly; they are socially costly
as well.”).

222

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:194

may also suffer from their own structural decision-making pathologies.158
Merely as examples of the well-established catalog of decisionmaking biases, consider those involving systematic overoptimism;159 problems with unreasonably discounting future events;160
arbitrary framing effects;161 anchoring our decisions on the basis of
arbitrary numbers;162 self-serving personal assessments,163 including a typical failure to recognize our own incapacities;164 a tendency
to unreasonably confirm and reinforce our own prior judgments;165
and grossly overgeneralizing from random events and from small
and unrepresentative samples.166 We tend to focus on mental images, rather than on actual quantities and magnitudes.167 More generally,
[t]he explanatory stories that people find compelling
are simple; are concrete rather than abstract; assign a
larger role to talent, stupidity, and intentions than to
luck; and focus on a few striking events that happened rather than on the countless events that failed
to happen.168
158

See the sources cited infra notes 178–83 and accompanying text, with attention in particular to PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN
AND HOW IT CAN DO BETTER 158 (2014).
159
See Trout, supra note 157, at 393.
160
See id.
161
See id. at 396.
162
See id.
163
See id.; see also JEAN M. TWENGE & W. KEITH CAMPBELL, THE
NARCISSISM EPIDEMIC: LIVING IN THE AGE OF ENTITLEMENT 42–46 (2009).
164
See Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How
Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121, 1121 (1999).
165
See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 178 (1998); THOMAS GILOVICH
& LEE ROSS, THE WISEST ONE IN THE ROOM: HOW YOU CAN BENEFIT FROM
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY’S MOST POWERFUL INSIGHTS 144 (2015).
166
See RICHARD E. NISBETT, MINDWARE: TOOLS FOR SMART THINKING 12
(2015).
167
See PHILIP E. TETLOCK & DAN GARDNER, SUPERFORECASTING: THE ART
AND SCIENCE OF PREDICTION 234–35 (2015).
168
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 199 (2011). For a more
elaborate but still incomplete catalog, see AMOS TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
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Beyond these basically uncontroversial decision-making biases,
there are more contested but arguably important manifestations of
systematic irrationality at the level of individual and group decisionmaking, as in theories of false consciousness169 and of our inappropriate recourse to the various Freudian defense mechanisms.170 Consider in particular whether adult decision-making, even as to legal
policy, can ever be usefully thought of in terms such as denial, repression, regression, displacement, projection, identification, reaction formation, or rationalization.171 Both private actors and governments are capable as well of varying degrees of the cognitive vices
of self-delusion and self-indulgence.172
Individual and group decision-making are thus commonly riddled with irrationalities of various sorts. If the harm of such irrationalities were largely confined to the actors in question, and to consenting parties, the case for paternalism would be broadly strengthened.173 But here again,174 it is increasingly difficult to determine
whether any proposed response to individual irrationality should
count as a form of paternalism, or else at least as importantly as an
instance of protecting unconsenting third parties.
The most crucial complication, though, is that to one degree or
another, the officials charged with deciding whether to impose some
form of paternalistic regulation, and with implementing that regula-

Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3-20 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982).
169
See, e.g., Ron Eyerman, False Consciousness and Ideology in Marxist Theory, 24 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 43, 55 (1981).
170
See ANNA FREUD, THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE 42–44
(Cecil Baines, trans., Int’l Universities Press 1966) (1936) and the updating pursued in GEORGE E. VAILLANT, EGO MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE: A GUIDE FOR
CLINICIANS AND RESEARCHERS 3–17 (1992) and PHEBE CRAMER, PROTECTING
THE SELF: DEFENSE MECHANISMS IN ACTION 7 (2006).
171
For background, see the authorities cited supra note 170.
172
For background on different kinds of cognitive vices and pathologies, see
authorities cited infra notes 178–183.
173
Of course, we would even then have to factor in the harms and benefits to
individual cognitive and character development over time, and to one’s sense of
responsibility and motivation to learn.
174
See supra Section IV.
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tion, will themselves suffer from analogous biases, or else from biases and irrationalities more specific to officials and official decision-making bodies.175
Thus, decisions about legal paternalism in practice are made and
implemented at all stages by authorities who are to some degree or
another subject to their own variety of systematic pathologies of decision-making.176 Those authorities may also have their own public
or private agendas, potentially in conflict with whatever we might
imagine to be the proper role of legal paternalism.177 Their decisions
may reflect, directly or indirectly, what is known as monopoly rentseeking behavior and related pathologies.178 While conformist
175
See, e.g., Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, Little Brother is
Watching You: New Paternalism on the Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 685,
687 (2009) [hereinafter Rizzo, Little Brother is Watching]. For broader background, see sources cited infra notes 178–183.
176
See id.
177
See JULIAN LE GRAND & BILL NEW, GOVERNMENT PATERNALISM: NANNY
STATE OR HELPFUL FRIEND? 5 (2015); MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER,
NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 6–7 (2006) (“[A]dministrative
agencies may have a multitude of bureaucratic or ideological goals other than the
maximization of welfare.”); Rizzo, Little Brother is Watching, supra note 175, at
686–87; Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of
New Paternalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 905, 908–09 (2009) (noting the relevance
of Friedrich Hayek’s discussions of the difficulties involved in politically processing information held by many and widely dispersed actors); see also LOUIS
KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 412 (2002) (“[I]t often will be difficult for a government decisionmaker to know with confidence that
the As of the world would in fact like something else better”).
178
See Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges vs. Shoves, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 210, 211
(2014) (stating that public officials may be improperly affected by the outside
influences of organized private groups). For broad background, see EAMONN
BUTLER, PUBLIC CHOICE: A PRIMER 76–77 (2012) (“Rent seeking is the attempt
by particular groups to persuade governments to grant them . . . valuable monopolies or legal privilege.”). See also JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW
CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 19–20
(1998); ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. VISHNY, THE GRABBING HAND:
GOVERNMENT PATHOLOGIES AND THEIR CURES 92–93 (1998) (using as an example an official that grants private individuals a monopoly on government-produced goods in exchange for a bribe); WILLIAM C. MITCHELL & RANDY T.
SIMMONS, BEYOND POLITICS: MARKETS, WELFARE, AND THE FAILURE OF
BUREAUCRACY 66–70 (1994); BRIAN W. HOGWOOD & B. GUY PETERS, THE
PATHOLOGY OF PUBLIC POLICY 38–62 (1985); GORDON TULLOCK ET AL.,
GOVERNMENT FAILURE: A PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE 9–10 (2002).
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groupthink179 or swarm-mindedness can certainly afflict private individual decision-making,180 the decision-making pathology of
groupthink is most notorious in public decision-making contexts.181
The overall priorities of regulators and regulated parties may
also differ and conflict in relevant ways. James Q. Wilson argues in
particular that “advocates of regulation tend to believe that motives
and intentions are more important than results, and that implementation problems are matters of mere detail and goodwill.”182 Regulated parties may not fully share these sensibilities. More generally,
Peter Schuck has argued that “[n]onmarket failure, like market failure, is a systematic, incentives-based tendency of government policies.”183
The point is not that legally paternalistic policies are likely to be
designed and implemented either consistently well or consistently
poorly. Rather, individual and private group decision-making pathologies are merely the first among the expanding complications
involved in properly classifying government interventions as paternalistic or non-paternalistic in the first place, and then in assessing
the merits of legally paternalistic interventions. At some point, and
most typically in some complex, particularized context, some comparison of the relevant pathologies and biases of individual citizens
and government actors must logically be made. This multidimensional comparison would somehow have to take into account matters of comparative magnitudes, probabilities, interactive effects,
possible improvement, and the passage of time.

“Groupthink” is an excessive form of concurrence- seeking among members of high prestige, tightly knit policy-making groups. See Paul’t Hart, Irving L.
Janis’ Victims of Groupthink, 12 POL. PSYCHOL. 247, 247 (1991).
180
For a classic anticipation of some features of conformist-oriented groupthink in a private context, see Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure,
193 SCI. AM. 32, 32–34 (1955).
181
See generally IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 138
(1972) (focusing in particular on the Cuban Missile Crisis); IRVING L. JANIS,
GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 9–
11 (2d ed., 1982).
182
JAMES Q. WILSON, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 357, 393 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980). For background, see
PRESSMAN, supra note 148, at 169–76.
183
SCHUCK, supra note 158, at 150.
179
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Thus, in this respect as well, debate over the scope of legal paternalism is decreasingly a matter of basic principles, and increasingly a matter of detailed, murky, contextualized, painstaking conceptual and empirical inquiries. Below, we briefly note several important additional dimensions of the latter sorts of inevitably murky
conceptual and empirical considerations.
V. LEGAL PATERNALISM AND THE INCREASING SIGNIFICANCE OF
COMPLEX, DETAILED, CONTEXTUALIZED INQUIRY IN GENERAL
John Stuart Mill’s classic discussion of freedom184 and paternalism is explicitly intended to defend “one very simple principle”185
regarding government intervention into private choices. In reality,
though, as seems inevitable, Mill’s account instead is widely recognized as far from simple.186
To begin with, both private actors and potential legal regulators
must typically consider, to the extent that it is reasonable to do so,
matters such as the probability of one or more looming harms; the
gravity of those harms in one combination or another; the probability of achieving one’s goals, or something akin thereto; the various
sorts and magnitudes of value of achieving those goals; the possibility of growth and maturity over time in decision-making and the
value thereof, if any; the effectiveness with which any relevant messages and incentives are actually communicated; the value, if any,
of purely symbolic or expressive legal paternalism; any dignitary or
privacy considerations in any relevant sense of these terms; regulatory program costs in financial terms; the various costs of evasion;
and the availability and value of alternative, to some degree less

184

Self-defeatingly, Mill attempts to entirely set aside any concern for freedom of the will, as distinct from broadly political and social or interpersonal freedom. See MILL, supra note 89, at 70.
185
Id.
186
See DAVID O. BRINK, MILL’S PROGRESSIVE PRINCIPLES 190 (2013)
(“Mill’s simple statement of his basic principle is vastly over-simple.”); DALE E.
MILLER, J. S. MILL: MORAL, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 114 (2010) (“Mill
may never be so far wrong as when he describes [his] liberty principle as ‘very
simple’.”); Dworkin, MILL’S ON LIBERTY, supra note 18, at 61 (“This principle is
neither ‘one’ nor ‘very simple.’”).
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risky or otherwise costly, means of achieving one or more of one’s
goals, or something roughly like them.187
All such considerations will commonly partake more of questionable, if not occasionally arbitrary, speculation than of uncontroversial or even clearly meaningful calculation.188 A would-be legal
paternalist must often attempt to balance “the cognitive costs of improved decision against the costs of supplanting individual
choice.”189 To the extent that we no longer consistently believe in
fundamental dignity or in meaningful free will,190 the costs of ignoring or overriding individual wishes is thereby reduced. But abandoning the idea of genuinely free will does not seem to immediately
reduce the emotional intensity of many of our desires and choices,
or to instantly abolish all resentment of any perceived manipulation
of one’s choices.
Even if Kantian full autonomy is set aside, regulators must consider the degree to which a person’s preference, choice, or action
should still count as free, voluntary, or autonomous, however we
might choose to define the latter terms, which are inevitably multidimensional and multifactorial.191 A further monumental complication is that on most current understandings of even thin, diluted
forms of autonomy, it is entirely possible that some paternalistic interventions will respect or even increase autonomy in some regards,
while violating or decreasing autonomy in other regards, or in other
persons.192 We can hardly think of paternalism and autonomy as opposed basic principles if paternalism often enhances autonomy, in
the regulated party and in other persons. As in the case of the literal
paternalistic constraint of minor children, paternalistic regulation of
187

This typology is inspired by Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, supra note 54,
at 109–10.
188
For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six Questions (and Almost as Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV.
167, 168–71 (2014).
189
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism,
97 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1165, 1168 (2003).
190
See supra Section III.
191
See Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, supra note 54, at 110–11 (listing multiple
requirements of full voluntariness of action).
192
See, e.g., BRINK, supra note 186, at 190–91 (Mill’s prohibition on autonomously selling oneself into perpetual slavery as intended to be an autonomy-enhancing form of paternalism); Trout, supra note 157, at 414 (“Debiasing promotes
rather than undermines autonomy.”). See generally supra Section II.
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adult choice-making may result in both suppressing and promoting
relevant competencies over the long term.193
In addition, policymakers might well consider whether adopting
paternalistic policies could lead, unintentionally, to a gradual widespread desensitization to some paternalistic practices that we now
typically consider objectionable. The question of the existence of
genuinely slippery slopes is itself multidimensional and largely contextual. It is not unimaginable that less than fully successful paternalistic interventions may often be replaced by a succession of increasingly restrictive interventions.194 Such possibilities—as well as
that of an eventual over-reactive backlash—amount to a further important, but complex, complication well beyond the realm of any
basic principles.
Perhaps most important, though, are the complications that arise
when we try to limit paternalism to promoting merely what the regulated party already genuinely seeks or values. The idea is roughly
that such forms of paternalism can assist the regulated party in fulfilling that person’s own pre-existing aims, if not their currently chosen means, and are likely to promote both autonomy and happiness.195 There will indeed be some clear and unequivocal such cases,
as when we forcibly prevent someone from casually wandering off
a cliff, earning their immediate gratitude and ratification.196
But in other cases, determining what someone really seeks or
values, even if we consider their verbally expressed preferences,
will involve monumental complications.197 The key consideration is
193
Paternalistic interventions into the behavior of reasonably competent adults
may or may not be ratified at some later point by the regulated party. See generally
Dworkin, MILL’S ON LIBERTY, supra note 18, at 74–75.
194
For discussion from a range of viewpoints, consider the contributions of
Professors Whitman, Thaler, Klick, and Frederick to the symposium entitled Slippery Slopes and the New Paternalism, CATO UNBOUND (April 2010),
http://www.cato-unbound.org/issues/april-2010/slippery-slopes-new-paternalism
(last visited May 10, 2016).
195
This confluence is typically sought especially by libertarian paternalists.
For discussion, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?: THE POLITICS OF
LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 129 (2014). Libertarian paternalism is exemplified
by the required disclosure of food calorie counts in the absence of further manipulation, penalty, reward, distraction, burden, or constraint. See One-Year Countdown to Calorie Counts, supra note 11.
196
See, e.g., Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, supra note 54, at 112.
197
See, e.g., id. at 114–116.
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not that our individual goals may not actually be promoted by the
means we choose to pursue those goals.198 Even in such cases, we
sometimes ascribe intrinsic value to a chosen means, or to our ability
to grow through making the choice, thereby blurring the distinction
between means and ends.199 Sometimes, the means we choose in
seeking an end is itself of great value to us.200
Rather, the crucial complication is that each of us genuinely
seeks incompatible important goals. The idea that each individual
values or pursues mutually inconsistent goals, often at a single given
time, underlies some of our great literature, as well as arguments of
many of the great humanists and philosophers.201 Legal paternalists
thus cannot claim to promote one of those goals, at the expense of
another, by relying solely on our own clear preferences. Instead, paternalists must adopt some other rationale for privileging any one of
our important goals at the expense of others; or so, at least, one could
reasonably argue, thus creating a further crucial and typically contextualized complication.202
198
See, e.g., Marina Oshana, Against Autonomy: Justifying Coercive Paternalism, 124 ETHICS 392, 396 (2014) (reviewing SARAH CONLY, AGAINST
AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM (2012)). This would amount to
only the simplest sort of self-defeating behavior. See id.
199
See id. at 395–96.
200
See id. at 395.
201
At the absolute extreme, consider ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, STRANGE
CASE OF DR. JEKYLL AND MR. HYDE (Richard Dury ed., 2004) (1886). More manageably, suppose that a paternalist wanted to promote Hamlet’s values, or the values the paternalist thought Hamlet ought to have. Let us here simply assume that
Hamlet knows, consciously, his own goals. Could the paternalist really construct
some sort of neutrally explained, fully consistent hierarchy of Hamlet’s relevant
values? If we think so, we must confront a range of issues briefly referred to
above, as raised by Rousseau, Marx, Sigmund and Anna Freud, and a plethora of
others. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 87 at 113 and accompanying text; Eyerman,
supra note 169 at 43; FREUD, supra note 170 at 5–10. For background, see ISAIAH
BERLIN, LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 166–181 (Henry
Hardy ed., 2002).
202
To layer on a further, undeniably important complication thereon, consider
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 234 (1977), in which Professor
Dworkin discusses the status of “external preferences.” We might, for example,
prefer some level of income or wealth for ourselves, while also holding a more or
less sustained, intense, or somehow “deeper” preference for how income and
wealth should be distributed at a broad societal level. Can a paternalist readily
determine how a person really prioritizes these two kinds of preferences?
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And finally, there are the various more specific complications
more or less uniquely associated with each of the distinct subject
matter areas that often involve legal paternalism. Merely for example, consider the arguably paternalistic203 legal regulation of recreational or mood-altering drugs.204 No basic abstract principle can allow us, for example, to predict how much legalization—or some
form of decriminalization—of one or more such drugs will increase
or decrease the consumption of any particular drug, or any associated social costs.205
More specifically, no basic principle of either support for or rejection of legal paternalism can even begin to clarify the price elasticity of demand, under various circumstances, for a particular drug;
the status of a drug as what is technically known as an inferior or
superior economic good; the degree of competitiveness of future
supply markets for the drug; the effects on any related crimes of
fraud or violence; possible regimes of sales and excise taxes; the
collection, and any systematic evasion, of such taxes; the real value
of any purposes to which such additional tax revenues are put; the
costs and benefits of any legally mandated strengths or quality control measures and the evasion of such regulations; issues of civil or
criminal liability for breaches of regulations associated with decriminalization; any increased costs of rent-seeking efforts in the context
of drug deregulation; interstate smuggling under different legal and
tax regimes; the possibility of a net reduction in the costs of prosecuting drug related activities; and any effects, over time, on rates of
impaired driving, and of drug addiction and costs of treatment.206
Individually and cumulatively, these considerations are neither
trivial nor obvious in their impact, let alone in their magnitude or
moral weight. Increasingly, responsible discussion of anti-paternalistic drug decriminalization will inevitably focus on our best
203

As implied by Section IV, mood-altering drugs could be regulated entirely
on either paternalistic or non-paternalistic grounds, or on a mixture thereof.
204
A further complication is that we might want to vary the degree of paternalism according not only to the particular drug, but to the particular circumstances of use as well.
205
For background, see HUSAK & DE MARNEFFE, supra note 3, at 101.
206
See generally id. at 100; Ranjit Dighe, Legalize It—The Economic Argument, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ranjitdighe/legalize-marijuana-economic-argument_b_4695023.html (last updated Ap
ril 1, 2014).
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guesses, slowly accumulating experiences, and on detailed, technical arguments as to the above sorts of considerations, rather than
on the more or less mechanical application of any broad paternalist
or anti-paternalist principles.
VI. THE ECLIPSE OF PRINCIPLE IN THE GLUCKSBERG ASSISTED
SUICIDE CASE
Each of the basic themes explored above can be illustrated in the
evolving national and international debate over arguably paternalistic restrictions on the legal availability of assisted suicide. The
number of thoughtful discussions regarding the law and morality of
assisted suicide and of voluntary euthanasia is quite substantial,207
with concerns for paternalism and autonomy often being central
thereto.208 In some instances, paternalism may underlie not only the
207

For a brief overview, see generally Robert Young, Voluntary Euthanasia,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/euthanasia-voluntary (last updated Dec. 16, 2014); Dan W. Brock, A Critique of Three Objections to Physician-Assisted Suicide, 109 ETHICS 519, 521–23 (1999); John Deigh,
Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia: Some Relevant Differences, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1155, 1156 (1998); Luke Gormally, Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: Seven Reasons Why They Should Not Be Legalized,
CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY, http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/resources/lifeand-family/euthanasia-and-assisted-suicide/euthanasia-and-assisted-suicideseven-reasons-why-they-should-not-be-legalized/ (last visited May 12, 2016);
Danny Scoccia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, Disability, and Paternalism, 36 SOC.
THEORY & PRAC. 479, 481 (2010); Alan Soble, Paternalism, Liberal Theory, and
Suicide, 12 CAN. J. PHIL. 335, 335 (1982); Bonnie Steinbock, The Case for Physician Assisted Suicide: Not (Yet) Proven, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 235, 235 (2005);
Judith Jarvis Thomson, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments, 109
ETHICS 497, 497 (1999); Carl Wellman, A Legal Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide Defended, 29 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 19, 22 (2003); Carl Wellman, A Moral
Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide, 38 AM. PHIL. Q. 271, 271 (2001). For broader
discussion of the appropriate role of medical paternalism, see TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 101–41
(7th ed. 2013) (on autonomy); see also Allen Buchanan, Medical Paternalism, 7
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 370 (1978).
208
See generally the authorities cited supra note 207. See also Gerald
Dworkin, Introduction to EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE 5 (Gerald
Dworkin, R.G. Frey & Sissela Bok eds., 1998) (endorsing “the claims of autonomy and relief of suffering of competent patients who are suffering from a terminal illness or an intractable, incurable medical condition that the patient experiences as incompatible with her fundamental values”).
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legally binding rules and the judgments of hospitals and physicians,
but the private decisions of families209 and even of the patients themselves.210 The family of a person contemplating assisted suicide may
thus seek to paternalistically override the admittedly competently
arrived at preferences of that person.211 And a person might choose
for or against assisted suicide based partly on the perhaps paternalistic belief that the family does not recognize or cannot promote its
own long-term interests.212 Again, our purpose herein is not to take
sides on any normative issue, but to emphasize the diminishing
value in our day of broadly principled stances for or against legal
paternalism.
To the extent that suicide, and assisted suicide in particular, affect non-consenting third parties, the most valuable debate must focus in part on boundary line questions, along with various other particularized and contextualized questions.213 As suggested above,
some assisted suicide cases will involve mixtures of several distinct
motives. 214 Such motives may include a desire to shape, to some
degree, the basic structure of one’s life;215 a possible sense of pointlessness, alienation, futility, moral obligation, responsibility, social
benevolence, nihilism, isolation, hopelessness, or anomie; a concern
for dignity in the sense of an anticipated, or feared, personally, or
socially, perceived humiliation; a deep cultural or religious commitment to a morality of honor and disgrace, or of personal independence;216 one’s metaphysical commitments and attitudes toward pain
or suffering; and a desire to promote the interests of one’s family.

209

See Felicia Ackerman, Assisted Suicide, Terminal Illness, Severe Disability, and the Double Standard, in PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE: EXPANDING THE
DEBATE 149, 157 (Margaret P. Battin, Rosamond Rhodes & Anita Silvers eds.,
1998).
210
See id.
211
See id.
212
See id.
213
See supra Section IV.
214
See Ackerman, supra note 209, at 150–58.
215
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’
Brief, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Mar. 27, 1997), www.nybooks.com/articles
/1997/03/27/assisted-suicide-philosophers-brief. For commentary thereon, see
Paul J. Weithman, Of Assisted Suicide and “The Philosophers’ Brief”, 109 ETHICS
548, 549–53 (1999).
216
See MACINTYRE, supra note 129, at 86.
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Not all such motives may justify legal paternalism to an equal degree.217
The major American case addressing physician assisted suicide
is Washington v. Glucksberg.218 While it is doubtless tempting to
think of the Glucksberg case as a broad showdown between advocates of a generalized constitutional right to personal autonomy219
and advocates of the federal constitutional permissibility of statelevel medical paternalism, the essence of the case is really found in
the aggregate of its various lower-level, contextualized, more specific complications.
The Glucksberg Court was crucially concerned, for example,
with several narrower gauge issues such as the scope and boundaries

217

The problem of a mixed-motive suicide case can overlap with the more
basic question of what constitutes a genuinely suicidal decision in the first place.
Immanuel Kant characterized at least some suicide cases as akin to a sentry deserting his assigned post. See IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 148–149
(Peter Heath & J.B. Schneewind eds., Peter Heath, trans., Cambridge Univ. Press
1997) [hereinafter KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS]. But it would seem that remaining at one’s assigned military post, in the face of certain death, for no evident
military benefit, may or may not count as suicidal. See, e.g., id. at 146.
Kant elsewhere seeks to illustrate the idea of a categorical imperative through
questioning whether maxims of self-love or of avoiding disutility underlying a
choice of suicide could be universalized. See KANT, GROUNDWORK supra note 95,
at 89. But elsewhere, Kant seems to more broadly reject suicide grounded in the
value of autonomy, on the obvious ground that autonomy-asserting suicide puts
an end to the autonomous actor. See id. at 96–97; KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS,
supra, at 145. Kant actually seems to rely, to some degree, on a sense of horror or
abhorrence at the presumed unnaturalness of suicide. See id. at 146.
For further discussion of Kant on suicide, see Michael Cholbi, Kantian Paternalism and Suicide Intervention, in PATERNALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 115, 125–
33 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2013); Michael J. Cholbi, Kant and
the Irrationality of Suicide, 17 HIST. PHIL. Q. 159 (2000); Michael J. Seidler, Kant
and the Stoics on Suicide, 44 J. HIST. IDEAS 429 (1983); Gerard Vong, In Defence
of Kant’s Moral Prohibition on Suicide Solely to Avoid Suffering, 34 J. MED.
ETHICS 655 (2008).
218
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
219
See Ronald Dworkin, et al., supra note 215 (understandably devoting substantial attention to such matters). See also, in the investigational drug availability
context, Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 717 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(Rogers, J., dissenting) (recognizing “the concept, fundamental in American jurisprudence, that ‘every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body.’” (citations omitted)).
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of any legitimate state interest in preserving life.220 In this respect,
the crucial dispute in this context was not over the sheer existence
of any such legitimate interest, but whether such an interest, if pursued by a state, is confined to those persons who can both “contribute to society and have the potential to enjoy life,”221 whether the
wishes of the patient must be considered at this point,222 or whether
the state interest in promoting life can instead be more broadly construed.223 A further imaginable option would be to confine the legitimate scope of the state interest in preserving life to persons with the
declared or apparent potential to subjectively enjoy life, whether that
person is also judged to be in some relevant sense a potential net
contributor to society or not.224
Further, the scope of any possible federal or state constitutional
right to assisted suicide would also inevitably depend on narrowgauge, particularized, and partly empirical questions going to difficult matters of individual competence and consent.225 Any clinical
psychological depression;226 the degree of consistency, persistence,
and clarity of the desire for assisted suicide; and the understanding
of likely future medical risks, options, treatments, side effects, and
outcomes must be considered by the patient or an appropriate decisionmaker along with the regulating government.227
No less crucial are complex questions of the potential for subtle
and even unintended forms of informal coercion related to poverty,
public costs and benefits, short-term budget constraints, public relations, insurance status, age, or disability.228 Any such considerations
might actually narrow the scope of any supposed right against paternalistic restrictions, lest the supposed right to assisted suicide be
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See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728–30.
Id. at 729 (quoting Respondents’ brief).
222
See id. (citing the Ninth Circuit opinion below).
223
See id. (citing the State of Washington’s official view). For a further variety
of conceivably legitimate government interests in aid in dying cases, see Morris
v. Brandenburg, 356 P.3d 564, 579 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
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See generally Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 729.
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See generally id. at 729–31.
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See id. at 730.
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See generally id. at 730–31, 733.
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See id. at 732.
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transformed into what amounts to a contextualized duty to die, or
into an instrument of discrimination.229
On the other hand, a right to assisted suicide might be expanded
if what is thought to constitute a “terminal” illness is thought to be
often too complex or contestable. 230 We might then wish to err on
the side of rights-protection by eliminating any requirement that the
illness be terminable.
More broadly, the relevance of highly contextualized “slippery
slope” arguments bearing specifically upon assisted suicide must
then inevitably be somehow addressed.231 The slipperiness of any
particular slope regarding, for example, an initial legal requirement
that there be a terminal and not merely a chronic or acute illness, or
of unrelieved suffering or physical pain, or of any physician involvement at one stage or another, would all require attention at some
point.232 Even if we perceived a slippery slope toward fewer restrictions on assisted suicide in, we would have to decide whether
we would still object to ending up at the bottom of the particular
slippery slope by the time we actually arrived there.
Even more subtly, the various issues associated with possible
professional role stress for the health professionals involved, as well
as any possible fear on the part of the patient, of judgmentalism, of
a bureaucratic mentality, or of shifting realistic interests and loyalties on the part of the most directly involved health care professionals, must be somehow addressed.233 It is certainly possible to argue
that professional role stress in such cases will either be minimal or
else largely confined merely to a transitional generation of health
care professionals. Again, though, our point herein is not to take
sides on any such questions, but to emphasize the increasing importance in the assisted suicide contexts of many such relatively narrow-gauge, complex, circumstantial, partly empirical issues, rather
229

See id.
See id. at 733; see also id. at 752–54 (Souter, J., concurring). Such determinations would crucially depend upon choosing some more or less arbitrary time
frame, and some particular degree of tolerance for what we imagine to be any
errors in prognosis. See id. See also United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544,
556–57 (1979) (regarding the statutory drug safety and efficacy requirement in
the context of purportedly terminally ill patients).
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See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732–33. See also generally supra note 194.
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See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 754–55 (Souter, J., concurring).
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than any broad principles.234 This theme recurs throughout any discussion of the proper contemporary role of legal paternalism in general.
CONCLUSION
We commonly think of debates over the proper role of legal paternalism as largely focused on issues of basic principles. This Article has, to the contrary, called attention to the developing eclipse of
broad or basic principle in matters of legal paternalism.
In part, this eclipse of principle is due to the increasing variety
of distinct understandings of both legal paternalism and of the idea
of autonomy, to which legal paternalism increasingly bears a contested and complex relationship.
Beyond this development, there is a rapidly increasing skepticism toward the view of autonomy that would afford the most ambitious foundation for broadly rejecting paternalism at a fundamental level—that of full Kantian-style autonomy. To the extent that full
234
At the state level, see, e.g., Cal. Assemb. Bill 15, 2015–2016 2d Ex. Sess.,
ch. 1, 2015 (Cal. 2015) (recognizing a relatively narrowly constrained right of
terminally ill persons to physician assisted suicide). See also Donorovich-O’Donnell v. Harris, 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 579, 582–83 (2015) (holding that there is no California state constitutional right to assisted suicide despite a newly enacted, but
not yet effective and potentially challengeable, state statute). Similar narrowgauge issues have been playing themselves out in Canada as well, despite any
headline-oriented focus on the assertion or denial of broad constitutional rights to
assisted suicide. For background, see the Canadian Supreme Court’s recognition
of a relatively broad but also variously constrained right to physician suicide in
Carter v. Canada, [2015] 1 S.C.R 331, 335 (Can.) (recognizing, for example, the
possible perverse incentive for premature personal suicide before the patient loses
the ability to commit suicide without physician assistance); KELVIN KENNETH
OGILIVE & ROBERT OLIPHANT, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN DYING: A PATIENTCENTRED APPROACH, 42ND PARLIAMENT, 1ST SESSION., REP. OF THE SPECIAL
JOINT COMM. ON PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DYING 12 (Feb. 2016), http://www.parl.
gc.ca/content/hoc/Committee/421/PDAM/Reports/RP8120006/pdamrp01/pdamr
p01-e.pdf (emphasizing the concept of subjective intolerability for the patient, as
distinct from terminality, or any irremediability of the medical condition);
CANADIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES-BASED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
A CANADIAN APPROACH TO ASSISTED DYING (Jan. 2016) https://www.cma.ca/Assets/assets-library/document/en/advocacy/cma-framework_assisted-dying_finaldec-2015.pdf (similar). For further comparative perspective, see Stephen Hoffman, Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Comparison of E.U. and U.S.
Law, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 383, 389–96 (2013).
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Kantian autonomy loses credibility, the argumentative focus naturally shifts toward various narrower, more contextualized, detailed,
and complex issues and claims.
As well, all forms of the classic distinction emphasized by John
Stuart Mill between actions that can somehow be regarded as selfregarding, and actions that can be considered to be other-regarding,
as a ground for a broadly principled approach to legal paternalism,
are in our culture increasingly dubious. In various respects, persons
are today more intensively interrelated and crucially interdependent,
and even inseparable, than would have typically been the case in
Mill’s day.
We are also increasingly recognizing the crucial role of various
cognitive biases, pathologies, and systematic irrationalities involved
in individual decision-making. A crucial complication, though, is
that we also increasingly recognize either similar or different such
systematic biases in the adoption and implementation of legally paternalistic and other government policies. Remarkably multidimensional problems of comparative biases and pathologies as among
private and public actors thus loom larger in discussions of legal paternalism.
Finally, this Article has gathered a number of more contextualized, but important, problems illustrating the increasing significance
of various narrow-gauge, multidimensional, circumstance-based,
particularized inquiries into concepts and evidence, as distinct from
basic principle. A number of these trends are on display, in concrete
fashion, in the context of the Glucksberg assisted suicide case. Such
relatively detailed considerations, however, promise to loom increasingly large in discussions of the proper role and limits of legal
paternalism in any context.

